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Modern central bankers are the risk managers of the financial system.  They take actions based not
only on point forecasts for growth and inflation, but based on the entire distribution of possible macroeconomic
outcomes.  In numerous instances monetary policymakers have acted in ways designed to avert disasters.
What are the implications of this approach for managin the risks posed by asset price booms?  To
address this question, I study data from a cross-section of countries to examine the impact of equity
and property booms on the entire distribution of deviation in output and price-level from their trends.
The results suggest that housing booms worsen growth prospects, creating outsized risks of very bad
outcomes.  By contrast, equity booms have very little impact on the expected mean and variance of
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1. Introduction 
 
We pay central bankers to be paranoid.  One of their primary responsibilities is to do 
extensive contingency planning, preparing for every possible calamity.  And when they do their 
job well, most of us don’t even notice.  In the past decade there are numerous examples of the 
central bank actions that were taken in response to an increase in the probability of disaster.  
These include the Federal Open Market Committee’s interest rate reductions in the fall of 1998 
that followed the Russian government’s bond default, the preparations for the century date 
change, the enormous liquidity injections in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as the discussions that occurred as nominal interest rates and 
inflation approached zero simultaneously.  All of these episodes demonstrate policymakers’ 
willingness to take actions in order to reduce the chance of disaster, acting as the risk managers 
for the economic and financial system. 
Then Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan put it best in 2003 when he said that 
“a central bank seeking to maximize its probability of achieving its goals is driven, I believe, to a 
risk-management approach to policy.  By this I mean that policymakers need to consider not only 
the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about 
that path.” (Greenspan 2003, pg. 3)   Importantly, the common practice of risk management 
requires controlling the probability of catastrophe.  For a financial intermediary, the focus is on 
reducing the risk of significant monetary loss.  For a central banker it suggests acting to reduce 
the chances that output or the price level will be substantially below trend. 
To control risk in financial institutions, risk managers employ the concept of value-at-risk, or 
VaR for short. Value-at-risk measures the worst possible loss over a specific time horizon, at a 
given probability.
1   A commercial bank might say that the daily VaR for a trader controlling 
$100 million is $10 million at a 0.1 percent probability.  That means that, given the historical 
data used in the bank’s models, the trader cannot take a position that has more than one chance in 
one thousand of losing 10 percent in one day.  
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In some circumstances, VaR is all you need.  For example, if it is being used to measure the 
probability of institutional insolvency, it doesn’t really matter how insolvent you are.  But 
policymakers may care about more than just VaR, may be concerned with the expected loss 
given that an event is in the lower tail – something called the expected tail loss (ETL).  That is, 
not only that the fifth or tenth percentile of the distribution of GDP outcomes fell, but what 
happened to the expected value conditional on being in the lowest fifth or tenth percentile.   
Risk-management measures like VaR and ETL are computed from the lower tail of the 
distribution of possible outcomes, examining the worst events that could occur.   This requires 
moving beyond simple quadratic measures of risk like variance or standard deviation.  It is fairly 
easy to imagine circumstances where the worst possible events have become worse, but the 
standard deviation of the distribution of all the possibilities is the same.  This is one view of the 
case in the fall of 1998. The point forecasts for the aggregate price level and the GDP gap, and 
their standard deviation stayed roughly the same.  But the lower tail shifted – the probability and 
size of a very bad outcome – rose.  Policymakers acted in response to the perception that the 
GDP at risk and expected tail loss had gone up.
2 
A risk-management approach comes naturally to central bankers.  It is the basis for the 
creation and maintenance of the lender of last resort: The policy of providing loans to private 
financial intermediaries that are illiquid but not insolvent helps to ensure that the payments 
system continues to operate smoothly. Together with deposit insurance, central bank lending is 
designed to reduce the probability of bank runs to a negligible level.   (The implementation of 
prudential regulation and supervision is the response to the moral hazard created by these 
policies.) 
The risks posed by asset price booms and crashes are a prime candidate for the risk 
management approach.  Bubbles increase the volatility of growth, inflation, and threaten the 
stability of the financial system.   The 2003 IMF World Economic Outlook estimates that the 
average equity price bust lasts for 2½ years and is associated with a 4 percent GDP loss that 
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affects both consumption and investment.  While less frequent, property (or housing) busts are 
twice as long and are associated with output losses that are twice as large.
 3 
Asset price bubbles distort decisions throughout the economy and are a source of instability. 
Wealth effects cause consumption to expand rapidly and then collapse.  Increases in equity 
prices make it easier for firms to finance new projects, causing investment to boom and then 
bust. The collateral used to back loans is overvalued, so when prices collapse it impairs the 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries that did the lending.  
As the IMF evidence makes clear, any discussion of bubbles must distinguish between equity 
and property prices.   This is true for several reasons.  First, the efficient markets hypothesis is 
more likely to apply to equity than to property. Arbitrage in stocks, which requires the ability to 
short sell, is at least possible.  In housing and property, it is not. Second, even in the few 
countries with sizeable equity markets, ownership tends to be highly concentrated among the 
wealthy – people whose consumption decisions are well insulated from the vicissitudes of the 
stock market.  By contrast, home ownership is spread much further down the income and wealth 
distribution.  Finally, in many countries housing purchases are highly leveraged leaving the 
balance sheets of both households and financial intermediaries exposed to large price declines.   
This suggests that the macroeconomic impact of a boom and crash cycle in property prices might 
be larger in countries that have more credit outstanding.
 4 
In this paper I examine equity and housing price booms and crashes from a risk management 
perspective.  Using equity price data from 27 countries and housing price data from 17 countries, 
I will look at the various consequences of rising equity and housing prices for growth and 
inflation.  I begin by investigating how asset price booms influence the mean and variance of 
deviations in (log) output and (log) price level from their (time-varying) trends.  I then proceed 
to measure both the GDP at risk and the price-level at risk that these booms create.  
The scarcity of booms and crashes, especially in property prices, mean that I must pool data 
across countries. From what data there is, I come to the following conclusions: Housing booms 
are bad in virtually every way imaginable; they create drive the output gap down, increase its 
                                                 
3 See the excellent essays in Chapter II of IMF (2003) for a summary of the evidence. 
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volatility, increase GDP at risk, and push the lower tail of outcomes (ETL) even lower 
(decreasing the expected value of the GDP gap conditional on being in the lower tail of the 
distribution).  By contrast, equity booms have little impact on either the level or volatility of the 
output and price-level gaps at horizons on three years; do not change GDP at risk, but increase 
the risk of prices falling dramatically below trend; and drive the lower tail (ETL) even lower. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides overwhelming evidence 
that the distribution of output and price level deviations from their trends have fat tails implying 
that methods based on quadratic loss and normal approximations could be misleading.  Then, in 
section 3, I characterized the distribution of output and price-level conditional on housing and 
equity booms.  That is, I look at the mean, variance, value-at-risk, and expected lower tail of 
output and price-level conditional on asset price booms.  Overall, the results suggest that normal 
approximations are inadequate.  Section 4 expands the discussion contrasting housing and equity 
booms. 
There is a growing consensus that traditional interest rate policy is not a very effective 
instrument in the battle to combat the deleterious macroeconomic effects of asset price bubbles.
5  
At the same time, equity and housing booms and busts pose clear risks to macroeconomic 
stability. Adopting a risk management perspective means asking whether there are institutional 
solutions to the problem.  That is, are there ways to structural the financial system that will then 
inoculate the real economy from the adverse effects of bubbles?  With this question in mind, I 
examine relative impact of asset price booms in economies with market- versus bank-based 
financial systems.  The results, reported in Section 5, suggest that market-based systems have a 
somewhat higher GDP at risk in the aftermath of equity booms, but the systems weather housing 
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2. GDP and Prices:  General Considerations 
Financial economists employ concepts like value-at-risk in order to address the problems 
created by fat tails.  That is, cases in which a normal (Gaussian) distribution provides an overly 
optimistic picture of the likelihood of extreme events.  Equity returns are notorious for exhibiting 
high probabilities of extreme events in their lower tail.  Because these “bad” outcomes are so 
important for controlling the risk of large losses, modeling them has attracted substantial 
attention.
6  
Figure 1:  GDP at Risk, Normal vs. t-Distribution Approximation 












































The “*”’s refer to the significance level of the Jacque-Bera test for normality.  A single “*” is for countries 
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 , where m3 and m4 are the sample third and fourth moments, and n is the sample size.  The 
statistic is distributed as c-squared with 2 degrees of freedom.   Test results are reported for the deviations of 
quarterly log GDP and log prices from an H-P filtered trend with parameter equal to 1600.  The sample is from 
1970 to 2003. 
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Aggregate output and prices share some of the properties exhibited by equity returns.  The 
distribution of deviations of (log) output and the (log) price level from their respective trend 
exhibit fat tails.  That is, the probability of observing a large negative realization is substantially 
higher than one would infer from a Gaussian distribution.  To see this, I have calculated the 5
th 
percentile of the distribution of log output and log price level deviations from their Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) trends, with smoothing parameter set to 1600, for a series of countries using 
quarterly data from 1970 to 2003.
7  These results are plotted in Figures 1 and 2. (The appendix 
provides a more detailed description of the data.) The figures also include results for a Jacque-
Bera test for normality – these are the *’s next to the country names. In 11 of the 17 cases 
presented, normality is rejected for 11 of 17 cases using the output gap and 10 of 17 using the 
price-level gap. 
Figure 2:   Price-Level at Risk, Normal vs. t-Distribution Approximation 










































See explanatory note for Table 1 above. 
                                                 
7 I have also computed results for a shorter sample beginning in 1985 that verify the inaccuracies of the normal 
approximation reported below.  In addition, the results throughout the paper are robust to using a smoothing 
parameter of 9600, rather than 1600; to using the residuals from a four-order autoregressions; and to using the 
residuals from the estimation of a two-equation aggregate demand – aggregate supply model based on Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999) as implemented in Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006) that includes interest rates. 
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The figures show the results for the following calculation.  For the normal distribution, this is 
just -1.645 times the standard deviation of the series.  The alternative, that takes the fatness of the 
tails of the distribution into account, begins by the computation of a Hill index.  As described in 
LeBaron and Samanta (2005), the Hill index is an estimate of the number of moments of a 
distribution that exist.  For a normal distribution, the index is infinity.   After computing the 
index, the tail is approximately distributed as a Student t with degrees of freedom equal to the 
Hill index value.  So, the t-distribution approximation to the 5
th percentile of the deviations of 
log GDP or the log price level from their trend is equal to the standard deviation of the series 
times the 5% level of the t-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the series’ Hill index.
8 
As one would expect, in some countries the deviations of output and prices from trend – their 
output and price-level gaps – have fatter tails than others.  But if one were to use the normal 
distribution, the errors would be large – averaging roughly 50%. For the U.S., the 5
th percentile 
of the normal distribution implies a deviation of output from trend of slightly more than -2½%.  
Taking the fatness of the lower tail of the actual data into account yields an estimate of more than 
-4½%.  That is the 5% GDP at risk for the U.S. (without conditioning on anything).  For the price 
level, the estimates diverge by less with the normal distribution giving a 5% price-level at risk 
equal to -2½% and the t-distribution approximation yielding an estimate of -3½%.    
It is important to keep in mind that standard statistical and econometric procedures are 
designed to characterize behavior near the mean of the data, so they are particularly ill-suited to 
the examination of tail events, especially when the data have fat tails.  This means that when 
extreme events are more likely than the normal distribution implies, and we care about them, it is 
important to adopt techniques that explicitly account for fat tails. 
3. Risks Created by Asset Price Bubbles 
Managing risk means having information about the entire distribution of possible outcomes. 
That is, one needs to know not only the mean and variance, but tail probabilities as well.  With 
that in mind, I now compute the mean, variance, value-at-risk, and expected lower tail for output 
and price-level deviations from their trends; all conditional on the asset price booms.   
                                                 
8 Computation of the Hill index requires the decision about where the tail of the distribution starts.  I take LeBaron 
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3.1 The Mean 
How do asset price booms change the mean and volatility of output and price-level gaps? I 
examine this question using a series of regression, which allow straightforward statistical 
inference. 
To study the conditional mean, consider the following regression: 
 (1)  xit = a + b dit-k(a) + eit , 
where xit is the either the level of the output (or price-level) gap; dit-k(a) is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value 1 if k periods earlier the filtered asset price data exceeds the threshold a.  The 
coefficient b measures the impact of the asset price boom on the distribution of the gap variable. 
Before continuing, let me pause to describe the procedure used to construct the data.
 9 First, 
for each country I take the deviation of the log of each series – real GDP, the aggregate price 
level, the real equity price index, and the real housing price index – from its Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered trend with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600 (the results are robust to using a 
parameter of 9600).   All data are quarterly, and most samples are from 1970 to 2003.
10  To 
construct the dummy variable dit-k, I filter the log equity and housing  price data using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter equal to 3200 (again, this is robust to increasing the 
parameter value).  It is important to note that the use of a two-sided filter means that large 
positive deviations of asset prices from this trend – these are the booms – must be followed by 
crashes.  Put another way, the booms I locate cannot continue indefinitely. 
Finally, taking deviations from country-specific (and time-varying) trends has the advantage 
that it removes country fixed effects.  While there are surely numerous conditions that vary in 
these countries over the sample, this is at least a minimum condition for pooling.
11 
 
                                                 
9 The 17 countries in the housing price sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K, and the U.S. The 27 
countries in the equity price data sample add Austria, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Peru, 
and South Africa.   
10 While it would be interesting to look at shorter samples, there is simply not enough data to do it. 
11 As in Section 2, the results in Section 3 are robust to use of residuals from a fourth-order autoregression; and use 
of residuals from a model that includes interest rates and external prices.  
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Table 1:  Impact of Asset Price Booms on the Levels 
  Level of the Output Gap    Price Level 
  Lag of Asset Price (k)    Lag of Asset Price (k) 
EQUITY 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  0.03  0.01  0.00  Data  -0.07  0.00  0.04 
  1.00  0.96  0.25    0.03  0.50  0.92 
4  1.05  0.28  -0.21  4  -0.61  0.10  0.99 
  1.00  0.99  0.10    0.30  0.58  0.94 
12  0.92  0.32  -0.15  12  0.04  0.54  1.32 
  1.00  0.99  0.23    0.51  0.71  0.92 
20  0.85  0.16  -0.07  20  -0.65  0.71  1.58 
  1.00  0.81  0.38    0.39  0.69  0.88 
HOUSING 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  0.06  -0.04  -0.09  Data  0.04  0.08  0.07 
  1.00  0.00  0.00    0.99  1.00  1.00 
2  0.46  -0.53  -0.92  2  0.62  0.96  0.70 
  1.00  0.00  0.00    1.00  1.00  1.00 
6  0.85  -0.50  -1.28  6  0.55  1.14  0.95 
  1.00  0.01  0.00    0.98  1.00  1.00 
10  1.10  -0.42  -1.42  10  0.52  1.19  1.04 
  1.00  0.12  0.00    0.92  1.00  1.00 
The table reports the coefficient b in the regression xit = a + b dit-k(a) + eit
 , where x is the deviation of 
either log GDP or the log price from an Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, with parameter 1600; and d is 
either a dummy variable equal to one if the filtered asset price exceeds the threshold (in percent), or 
the filtered asset price data itself.  In each case, the first row of numbers is the coefficient itself, while 
the second row is a p-value for the test that b is strictly less than zero, computed using Newey-West 
standard errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k.  Italicized values are significantly greater than zero, 
while bold values are significantly less than zero, both at the 5-percent level. Samples are described in 
the data appendix. 
 
Returning to the results, Table 1 reports estimates for equation (1).  To read the table, take the 
example of the last entry in the third column under housing.  That’s the one where the threshold 
a equals 10-percent and the lag k is 12 quarters.  For this case, the estimate of b is -1.42 with a p-
value of 0.00.  This means that, conditional on seeing a housing boom that is 10-percent above 
trend, the mean of the output gap 12 quarters later is on average -1.42 percent – that seems like a 
big number, and it is precisely estimated.
12 
                                                 
12 To address problems of heteroskedasiticity (throughout) and serial correlation (within each country) I have 
estimated the standard errors and resulting p-values using a panel version the Newey-West (1986) procedure with 
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Overall, these results allow a number of conclusions.  First, in the near term, at horizons of 
four quarters, both equity and housing booms lead to positive output gaps.  This is for the simple 
reason that the at a four-quarter horizon, an asset-market boom is likely to continue, adding fuel 
to the general economic growth.  Second, housing booms create future declines in output and 
increases in prices while equity booms do not.  And third, the bigger the housing boom, the 
bigger the expected drop in output and the expected increase in the price level.  
3.2  Volatility 
Next, I examine the impact of asset price booms on the volatility of output and price deviation 
from trend.  To do this, I regress the square of the gap, that is (xit)
2 on the dummy variable dit-
k(a).  That is: 
(2)  (xit )
2= a’ + b’ dit-k(a) + uit . 
To simplify interpretation, I standardize the data, dividing by the variance of the entire 
sample.  This means that the coefficient is a measure of the percentage increase in the volatility.  
So, for example, a number like 5.28 (that’s the estimate for a 10-percent housing price boom at a 
horizon of 4 quarters) means a 5.28-percent increase in volatility. The results are reported in 
Table 3, and they are quite stark.  Housing booms increase the volatility of growth at all 
horizons, and that’s it.  Interestingly, neither housing nor equity booms have a measurable 
impact on the volatility of prices. And equity booms do not affect the volatility of growth – the 
estimates are both economically tiny and statistically irrelevant. 
Focusing on the bottom left panel of the Table 3 – the impact of housing booms on GDP 
volatility – we see that the bigger the boom, the bigger the impact on volatility.  But the bigger 
impact is at short horizons where we know from Table 2 that on average growth rises.  So, while 
housing booms increase volatility, it seems to do it primarily on the up side. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Table 2:  Impact of Asset Price Booms on Volatility 
  Volatility of the Output Gap    Price Level Volatility 
  Lag of Asset Price (k)    Lag of Asset Price (k) 
EQUITY 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  0.00  0.01  0.00  Data  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0.14  0.07  0.30    0.38  0.08  0.18 
4  0.03  0.33  0.24  4  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0.43  0.08  0.14    0.15  0.54  0.46 
12  0.15  0.05  0.19  12  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0.26  0.41  0.15    0.13  0.13  0.12 
20  0.39  0.20  0.11  20  0.00  0.00  0.01 
  0.12  0.27  0.34    0.16  0.11  0.06 
HOUSING 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  0.22  0.12  0.05  Data  -0.02  0.00  0.02 
  0.04  0.18  0.35    0.64  0.53  0.34 
2  2.46  2.84  1.43  2  -0.09  0.50  0.66 
  0.02  0.01  0.12    0.57  0.12  0.17 
6  4.39  4.75  1.93  6  0.55  0.60  0.87 
  0.01  0.01  0.12    0.18  0.10  0.16 
10  5.48  2.46  5.28  10  0.88  0.38  0.80 
  0.04  0.07  0.04    0.16  0.23  0.19 
The table reports the coefficient b2 in the regression (xit)
2 = a2 + b2 dit-k(a) + hit, where x is the 
deviation of either log GDP or the log price from an Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, with parameter 
1600; and d is either a dummy variable equal to one if the filtered asset price exceeds the threshold a 
(in percent), or the filtered asset price data itself (those are the rows labeled “data”).  In each case, the 
first row of numbers is the coefficient itself, while the second row is a p-value for the test that b2 is 
strictly greater than zero, computed using Newey-West standard errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k. 
Bold values are significantly greater than one at the 5-percent level. 
 
 
3.3 GDP and Price-Level at Risk  
Next, I turn to an examination of the tails of the distribution of output and price-level 
outcomes, conditional on asset price booms. Are GDP at risk and price-level at risk are affected 
by the equity or housing booms or busts?  If, for example, there is a dramatic increase in equity 
prices should this change our view of the possibility of bad events?  And, importantly, are 
normal approximations likely to give the wrong signal?   Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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For equity booms, the answer to this question is reported in Figure 3.  The horizontal axis in 
the figure plots the minimum size of the equity price deviation, and the vertical axis plots the 
fifth percentile of the distribution of future outcomes for the GDP gap – the 5% GDP at risk.  
The two lines show the 5% GDP at risk 4 quarters ahead and 12 quarters ahead. So, for example, 
if equity prices are at least 10 percent above trend, the 5
th percentile of the distribution of the 
GDP gap 12 quarters into the future is -3.6.  As it turns out, this is only slight below the 5
th 
percentile of the unconditional distribution for deviations of GDP from trend, which is -3.44, so 
it isn’t very troubling. In other words, the GDP at risk from a 10 percent equity boom is only 
very slightly below than the unconditional GDP at risk.  The upper line in the figure, the 5% 
GDP at risk 4 quarters ahead, is always significantly above the unconditional 5
th percentile of the 
GDP gap distribution.  The reason for this is that all booms are likely to continue, so the horizon 
for the collapse of equity prices and GDP both is beyond 4 quarters. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Figure 4: Price-Level at Risk following an Equity Boom 
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+4 Quarters +12 Quarters Unconditional 
 
 
Figure 4 reports the results for price-level at risk following an equity boom. The price-level at 
risk results differ quite a bit from the GDP at risk results. Since some central banks will care Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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about prices rising while others may care more about prices falling, I report the risk results for 
both tails of the distribution. These are referred to as the 95% price-level at risk. As the equity 
boom grows, the risk of the price-level falling below trend (shown in Panel A of Figure 4) grows 
substantially.  When real equity prices are 15 percent or more above trend, the 5
th percentile of 
the distribution of price-level gap 4 quarters out is more than –9 percent.  Depending on the 
current level of inflation, that could be a significant risk. By contrast, the risk of the extreme 
positive price level gaps (in Panel B of Figure 4) goes down. Conditional on an equity boom, the 
distribution of price level deviations from trend shifts down.  
 

































Turning to housing bubbles, Figures 5 and 6 report computations analogous to those reported 
in Figure 3 and 4. The results in these two figures suggest that housing booms are followed by an 
increased risk of a large decline in GDP in 4 to 12 quarters, and a decreased risk of prices falling 
below trend.  Note from the scale that the GDP at risk is quite large.  When real house prices are Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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5% or more above trend, there is a 5% probability that 12 quarters later GDP will be at least 
3.44% below trend – substantially below the unconditional 5
th percentile of -2.86%.
13 
Housing booms affect the price-level at risk as well. The information in Figure 6 suggests that a 
housing boom has very little impact on the upper tail of the price-level distribution, but 
dramatically eliminates the lower tail – at least at a 12-quarter horizon. Unconditionally, the 
upper tail 5% price-level at risk 12 quarters following a 10% housing price boom is roughly one-
quarter the unconditional 5
th percentile – that is, it -1% as compared with -4%.   
 
 Figure 6: Price-Level at Risk following an Housing Boom 





































+4 Quarters +12 Quarters Unconditional 
 
                                                 
13 Note that because the countries in the sample differ, the unconditional distributions for the price-level and GDP 
gaps are different between the equity and housing booms. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Figure 6: Price-Level at Risk following an Housing Boom (cont.) 
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Comparing the Normal Approximation and the Empirical Density 
It is important to ask whether there is any difference between the results in Figures 3 and 5 
and those that from a simple normal approximation.  That is, if a central banker had been looking 
at the -1.645 times the standard deviation of the distribution of output and price-level gaps, 
conditional on an equity market boom, would they have done anything different?  The results 
suggest that the answer to this is yes. 
Figure 7 compares the 5
th percentile for the GDP gap computed using a normal approximation 
with one from the empirical density.   For equity booms, the normal approximation gives an 
overly pessimistic view of the size of the lower tail. The average distance between the two 
estimates of the 5
th percentile of the distribution is roughly three-quarters of one percentage 
point. This particular example suggests that employing a quadratic loss would likely 
overestimate the importance of an equity boom. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Figure 7:  Comparing the Normal Approximation with the Empirical Density 
GDP at Risk at +12 Quarter Horizon 
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Housing is another story. Here the normal distribution gives an overly optimistic view of the 
true size of the lower tail.  The 5
th percentile of the empirical density is on average 1.25 
percentage points below what is implied by the normal approximation.  Since the probability of Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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extreme negative outcomes for the GDP gap is higher than suggested by a Gaussian distribution, 
a quadratic loss will underestimate the importance of a housing boom.  
In the case of price-level outcomes, normal approximations are also misleading.  For example, 
twelve quarters following a housing boom, the 5
th percentile of the upper tail of outcomes is 2½ 
percentage points smaller than would be implied by simply multiplying the standard deviation of 
the observed outcomes by 1.64. 
3.4. Expected Lower Tail Loss 
Direct statistical inference for a number like GDP at risk is difficult.  Instead of constructing 
Monte Carlo experiments that might allow confidence interval estimation, I turn to the 
examination the expected tail loss.  This is the expected value, conditional on being in the tail of 
the distribution.  As in the case of the GDP at risk and price-level at risk, here I ask whether the 
expected tail loss changes when asset prices boom.  In order to do inference, I run a regression 
similar to equation (1):  
(3)  xit = a + b0 dit-k(a) +b1tail(b)it+b3 dit-k(a)x tail(b)it +hit , 
where xit is the output or price-level gap; dit-k(a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if k periods 
earlier the filtered asset price data exceeds the threshold a.; and tail(b)it as a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if xit is in the b-percent lower tail of the distribution of all xit.   
The coefficient b3 on the interaction term in equation (3) provides an estimate of the impact of 
an asset price boom of size a on the expected tail loss in the lowest b-percent of the distribution 
of the output or price-level gap.  Because of the structure of the regression, it is possible to 
compute standard errors that are robust to both serial correlation and heteroskedasiticity in the 
error term hit.
14   
The results of this regression are reported in Table 3, and they are quite striking.  Asset price 
booms – both equity and housing – result in a fall in the expected lower tail loss.  The decline is 
both economically and statistically significant.   Put another way, equity and housing booms 
make it more likely that something bad will happen. 
                                                 
14 The estimation method is an adaptation of the Newey-West estimator to a panel in which there is serial correlation 
and heteroskedasiticity within a country, but no dependence between countries. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Table 3:  Impact of Asset Price Booms on the Lowest Quartile 
  Output Gap    Price Level Gap 
  Lag of Asset Price (k)    Lag of Asset Price (k) 
EQUITY 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  Data  -0.26  -0.21  0.03 
  0.10  0.12  0.63    0.02  0.06  0.59 
4  -3.81  -2.50  -1.87  4  -14.05  -16.12  -13.88 
  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00 
12  -4.63  -1.75  -1.70  12  -16.38  -19.20  -16.35 
  0.00  0.01  0.01    0.00  0.00  0.00 
20  -5.37  -2.05  -0.85  20  -18.06  -20.73  -17.36 
  0.00  0.02  0.05    0.00  0.00  0.00 
HOUSING 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Threshold 
(a a a a) 
4  8  12 
Data  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  Data  0.06  0.10  0.09 
  0.35  0.11  0.35    0.67  0.84  0.76 
2  -1.53  -1.08  -0.69  2  -2.47  -4.03  -5.01 
  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.01 
6  -1.42  -1.15  -0.28  6  -2.89  -4.83  -9.22 
  0.00  0.00  0.18    0.00  0.00  0.00 
10  -1.16  -0.34  -0.59  10  -3.28  -3.91  -12.29 
  0.00  0.12  0.08    0.00  0.00  0.00 
The table reports the coefficient b3 in the regression xit = a +b1 dit-k(a)+b2tail(b)it+b3 dit-k(a)x tailit(b) 
+ uit where  xit is the deviation of either log GDP or the log price from an Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
trend, with parameter 1600; tailit(b) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if xit  in the lower b-percent 
tail; and d is either  a dummy variable equal to one if the filtered asset price exceeds the threshold a 
(in percent), or the filtered asset price data itself (those are the rows labeled “data”).  In each case, the 
first row of numbers is the coefficient itself, while the second row is a p-value for the test that b3 (the 
coefficient on the interaction term) is strictly less than zero, computed using Newey-West standard 
errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k. Bold values are significantly greater than one at the 5-percent 
level. 
 
3.5  Summary of the Results 
Table 4 summarizes the results of this section.  The conclusion is that housing booms 
dramatically change the distribution of outcomes in virtually every way.  By contrast, equity 
booms have little impact on the mean and variance of deviation from trend, but do affect the 
lower tail of the distribution. 
 
 Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Table 4:  Summary of the Impact of Asset Price Booms  
on the Distribution of Macroeconomic Outcomes 
  Output Gap    Price-Level Gap 
  Lag of Asset Price    Lag of Asset Price  
Equity 
Moment  k=4  k=12  Moment  k=4  k=12 
Mean  Higher  None  Mean  None  None 
Variance  None  None  Variance  None  None 
5% VaR  Better  None  5% VaR  None  Worse 
25% Expected 
Tail Loss  Lower  Lower  25% Expected 
Tail Loss  Lower  Lower 
Housing 
Moment  k=4  k=12  Moment  k=4  k=12 
Mean  Higher  Lower  Mean  Higher  Higher 
Variance  Higher  Higher  Variance  None  None 
5% VaR  Better  Worse  5% VaR  Better  None 
25% Expected 
Tail Loss  Lower  Lower  25% Expected 
Tail Loss  Lower  Lower 
Table summarizes the results in Tables 1, 2, and 3 and Figures 3 to 6. 
 
4. The Difference between Equity and Housing Bubbles 
To understand the differential impact of equity and housing bubbles, it is useful to focus on 
their consumption effects. Booms in either equity or property prices drive up the wealth of 
individuals.  The natural response to an increase in wealth is to raise consumption. If you are 
rich, you can buy a fancy car, purchase a bigger and flatter television, go on nicer vacations, eat 
in expensive restaurants, and the like. And, the data show that this is exactly what happens. 
A useful rule of thumb is that a $1 increase in US wealth generates between 2 and 5 cents of 
additional consumption by American households.
15 That is, the marginal propensity to consume 
for wealth is in the range of 0.02 to 0.05. 
As Norman, Sebastia-Barriel and Weeken (2002) note, the marginal propensity to consume is 
of somewhat less interest than the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth. 
16 They 
emphasize that we care more about the impact of a 10% increase in the value of wealth than we 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Norman, Sebastia-Barriel and Weeken (2002). 
16 The elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth is equal to the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
times the ratio of wealth to consumption. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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do about the number of cents or pence that consumption rises per dollar or pound of additional 
wealth.  This is especially true of equity wealth, since the size of equity markets vary so widely 
across countries.  Bertaut (2002) reports that, at the end of 2001, total equity market 
capitalization equaled 153% of GDP in the U.K., but only 59% of GDP in Germany.  To 
understand the importance of this, consider the impact of a 10% increase in equity prices on 
consumption in each country, assuming that the marginal propensity to consume is the same.  
The estimated impact in the UK the impact would be roughly 3 times as large as that in 
Germany.
17   
This highlights the importance of thinking about bubbles in housing and equity prices 
separately.  There are two reasons for this.  First, equity prices are substantially more volatile 
than housing prices, so the former is much less likely to be permanent than the latter.  
Reasonably, households respond more aggressively to changes in wealth that they perceive to be 
permanent.
18  Second, equity ownership tends to be concentrated among the wealthy – people 
who are much less likely to adjust their consumption levels.  Housing ownership, by contrast, is 
distributed more broadly.  And while the quality of housing and the concentration of ownership 
vary across countries, the differences are far less dramatic.   
Returning to the evidence, using data from 14 developed countries Case, Quigley, and Shiller 
(2005) discusses how a one percent increases in housing wealth raises consumption by between 
0.11 and 0.17 percent.  By contrast, they find that the stock-market wealth elasticity of 
consumption is substantially smaller, only 0.02.  It is natural that the housing booms would have 
more of an impact on the distribution of macroeconomic outcomes than equity booms do. 
5. Policy Responses:  Risk Management and Financial Structure 
Is there anything to be done about all of this?  Can we provide any useful guidance on how to 
avoid the risks bubbles pose?  Researchers have investigated a myriad of possible responses 
including, but not restricted to reacting only to bubbles insofar as they influence inflation 
                                                 
17 Careful econometric estimates show an even larger disparity. Bertuat (2002) reports that 10% increase in stock 
market creates 0.5 to 1.0% increase in consumption in the long run in the US and U.K., but only 0.07 in Germany 
where the equity is less than 60% of GDP. 
18 Kishor (2005) estimates that while 98% of the change in housing wealth is permanent, only 55% of the change in 
financial wealth is. This suggests that the housing wealth effect should be roughly twice the stock-market wealth 
effect.  Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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forecasts; reacting only to the fallout of a bubble after it bursts; leaning against a bubble as it 
develops; including asset prices in the price index central bankers target; and examining various 
regulator solutions involving margin and lending requirements.  In Cecchetti (2006) I summarize 
the traditional debate in each of these cases. Briefly, there is a consensus building against the 
purely activist view. As Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2003) discuss, the information requirements 
for the activism are fairly high and there are significant risk of costly missteps.  The conclusion 
is that interest rates may not be the best tool for combating the destabilizing effects of asset price 
bubbles 
From a risk management perspective, the discussion of central bank responses to asset price 
bubbles is unnecessarily restrictive.  Why focus only on traditional monetary policy?  Risk 
managers do more than simply monitor and react to developments; they build institutional 
structures that are unlikely to collapse when hit by large shocks.  The regulators and supervisors 
of the financial system have built mechanisms exactly like this. Are there similar responses to 
bubbles?  When subjected to equity and property price bubbles, are some financial systems more 
resilient than others? 
Recent work by Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) and Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and 
Krause (2005) suggests that changes in the financial system have been an importance source of 
stabilization over the past several decades.  Their results suggest that enhanced household access 
to credit has allows for increased consumption smoothing that has been a major factor in 
reducing the volatility of aggregate real growth.
19  This brings up the natural question: Does the 
impact of housing and equity bubbles on GDP at risk or price-level at risk depend on financial 
structure? 
 
                                                 
19 The argument is that there is a linkage not only between financial system development and the level of real 
growth, as describe in Ross Levine’s (1997) survey, but also between financial development and the stability of real 
growth. Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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To examine this, I begin with data on financial structure taken from Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001). Briefly, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine have constructed a data set on financial 
indicators during the 1990s covering a broad cross-section of countries.  Included are measures 
of the relative size of a country’s stock market and banking sector, as well as a measure of the 
relative efficiency of the two.  Countries with “market-based financial systems” are those with 
bigger more efficient stock markets.  I examine the relationship of this composite financial 
structure index and the behavior of an economy following booms in equity or housing prices. 
As a first step, I reproduce Figure 3 and 5 with the data for GDP at risk dividing the data 
based on whether it comes from a country with a predominantly market-based or bank-based 
financial system.  The results, reported in Figure 8, show that for countries where equity markets 
are important, equity booms increase GDP at risk.  By contrast, GDP at risk following a housing 
boom is not sensitive to financial structure as characterized by this index. 
To examine this a bit further, and try to get a grasp on whether any of it is precise in a 
statistical sense, I add the I add the financial structure variable to regressions (1), (2) and (3) – 
both as a level and interacted with the asset-price boom dummy.  Here’s an example: 
(1’) xit = a + b dit-k(a) + cfi + dfi dit-k(a)+eit , 
(2’) (xit )
2= a’ + b’ dit-k(a)+c’fi + d’fi dit-k(a)+ uit . 
(3’) xit = a + b0 dit-k(a) +b1tail(b)it+b3 dit-k(a)x tail(b)it  
       b4 fi+b5 fi dit-k(a) +b6 fi tail(b)it+b7 fi dit-k(a)x tail(b)it +hit . 
where fin is the composite structure index from the CD-ROM that is distributed with Demirguc-




                                                 
20 The index average of deviations from the mean of (1) stock market capitalization divided by deposit money bank 
assets (relative size of stock market compared to banking sector), (2) total value traded in stock market divided by 
claims on private sector by deposit money banks (relative activity of stock market compared to banking sector), and 
(3) total value traded in stock market as a share of GDP divided by banking overhead costs as a share of total assets 
(relative efficiency of stock market compared to banking sector).  The actual data are column EQ in the file called 
“request8095.xls.”  These data are the same as those  Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Figure 8:  Market- vs. Bank-based Financial Systems 
GDP at Risk at +12 Quarter Horizon 
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Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions terms in each of these; fi dit-k(a) 
in equations (1’) and (2’), and fi dit-k(a)x tail(b)it in equation (3’).  These tells us whether 
differences in financial structure change the impact of an asset price boom on the mean, Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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variance, or lower tail events in the distribution of the output gap. I report the results for a lag of 
4 and 12 quarters.   The financial structure index is positive for market-based economies and 
negative for bank-based ones.  For example, it takes on a value of +0.17 for the US and –0.18 for 
Greece. 
Table 5:  Financial Structure and the Impact of Asset Price Booms 
EQUITY 
  Mean  Variance  Lowest Quartile 
Lag of Asset Price in Quarters  Threshold 
(a a a a)  4  12  4  12  4  12 
  Mean  Variance  Lowest Quartile 
Data  0.07  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.06  -0.07 
  1.00  0.15  0.62  0.32  0.84  0.10 
8  1.50  -0.60  0.01  -0.01  1.41  -1.20 
  0.95  0.31  0.31  0.65  0.69  0.25 
16  2.31  -0.87  0.01  0.00  3.68  -2.03 
  0.97  0.26  0.30  0.45  0.74  0.11 
20  2.88  -1.82  0.00  0.02  5.25  -3.57 
  0.98  0.12  0.42  0.19  0.78  0.06 
HOUSING 
  4  12  4  12  4  12 
Data  -0.14  -0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.05 
  0.07  0.36  0.65  0.54  0.44  0.64 
4  -1.40  -1.60  0.03  -0.03  -1.06  0.59 
  0.16  0.14  0.37  0.63  0.21  0.65 
8  -1.90  -0.02  -0.09  -0.03  -0.50  0.19 
  0.21  0.50  0.71  0.59  0.40  0.54 
10  -0.83  0.04  -0.20  -0.04  -0.10  0.89 
  0.38  0.51  0.77  0.58  0.49  0.61 
Table reports the regression coefficients from the interaction of the financial structure 
measure with the asset price boom dummy variable in equations (1), (2), and (3).  The 
more positive financial structure, the more market-based a countries financial system; 
the more negative, the more bank-based it is. Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
computed using heterskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, as 
described in the notes to Tables 1, 2, and 3.  
   
Unsurprisingly, the strongest results are those for the mean.  In countries with market-based 
financial systems, which is to say places where equity markets are important, the first and second 
column of the top panel in Table 5 shows that equity price increases lead to bigger short-horizon 
booms and bigger long-horizon crashes (although the latter are imprecisely estimated).  
Analogously, for bank-based economies, housing booms lead to bigger short-horizon GDP 
booms, but smaller long-horizon crashes.  (These are the results in the first and second column of 
the bottom panel of the table.) Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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Turning to the volatility, there is no measurable impact on financial structure. The point 
estimates reported in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 are all small and the the p-values 
are never below 0.2 or above 0.8.  
Finally, looking at the far right columns of Table 5, the results from estimating equation (3’), 
there is some weak evidence that market-based economies fare somewhat worse at longer-
horizons when hit with equity price booms.  Again, this is really no surprise. 
In the end, these results are disappointing. While we may believe that financial structure plays 
are role in the real economic impact of asset price booms, the available data do not show much 
evidence of it.  
6.  Conclusion 
Stability is the watchword of monetary policymakers.  Listening to most modern central 
bankers speak about their goals you are likely to hear about the desire for low, stable inflation 
and high, stable growth.  Policymakers will explain how they raise and lower short-term interest 
rate targets in order to meet their stability-oriented objectives.  But listen closely, and you will 
realize that the statements are nuanced.  While stability is the ultimate objective, it is the 
possibility of catastrophe that keeps central bankers awake at night.  They want to ensure that 
nothing really bad happens, and to do this they consider the entire distribution of possible 
outcomes. 
In analyzing the macroeconomic impact of asset price booms and crashes, it is the disasters 
that are the true concern. This suggests a different approach to managing risk; one based on 
keeping the probability of output deviating from its trend (or price level deviations from its target 
trend) over some time horizon below some fixed threshold.  The implication is that policy 
responses be designed to keep the lower tail of the distribution – as measured by value-at-risk or 
the expected tail loss – sufficiently small. 
In this paper I use data from a broad cross-section of countries to examine the mean, variance, 
and lower tail risks arising from booms and crashes in equity and housing markets.  The 
conclusion is that housing bubbles change the entire distribution of macroeconomic outcomes.  Cecchetti    Asset Price Booms 
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By contrast, equity bubbles tend to make the worst events even worse, leaving the mean and 
variance of the distributions roughly unchanged.  The strongest conclusion is that 
approximations that use the normal distribution, and analyses based on quadratic loss functions, 
have the potential to be extremely misleading. Looking further, I present weak evidence 
suggesting that those countries with market-based financial systems, where stock market 
capitalization is relatively large, weather housing booms somewhat better and equity booms 
somewhat worse than countries with bank-based financial systems. 
In closing, it is important to emphasize one critical implication of adopting a risk management 
view.  As mentioned earlier, econometric modeling tends to provide go characterizations of what 
happens near the mean of the data.  In fact, in order to improve the quality of estimates, 
researchers have a tendency to remove outliers.  This is sometimes done in the guise of 
sensitivity analysis, and other times using limited-influence estimation that explicitly truncates 
tail observations.  This means that standard modeling strategies provide virtually no information 
about the behavior of the economy when it is under stress.  As a result, evaluating the problems 
posed by extreme events, which is at the core of risk management, necessarily requires 
judgment.  And, to quote Chairman Greenspan (2004) one final time: “Such judgments, by their 
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